The ANC's Two-state South African State: Its own Colonialism and Affinity for Monopoly Capital in the Era of the Capitalocene. Part I

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'What happens to a society depends mainly on the perceived interests and the tastes of the people and groups within it and on their power to secure those interests' (Lipton 1986: 2).

Abstract

The ANC's myth of 'a better future for *all* South Africans' has been exposed in a matter of years after 1994 (and even before) because its own systematic colonisation of the country and development of a particular type of *ANC-capitalism* has reached its highest stage in the form of state capture. Institutionalised self-enrichment at the material disadvantage of *all* South Africans, have made the majority poorer, unfree and disillusioned. ANC 'governance' is unsustainable because it allowed and perpetuates expropriation without compensation of the country over 25 years and has 'nationalised' centres of capital accumulation that are supposed to benefit the entire population. The ANC cannot function without colonisation, ANC-capitalism, centres of surplus capital accumulation, and cannot work with monopoly capital. As a result, the ANC is on trial and its most recent history of 25 years cannot be deleted. The ANC has become the second Steinhoff for *all* South Africans.

Key words: ANC-capitalism, state capture, two-state state, colonialism, world-ecology, white monopoly capital (WMC), centres of surplus monopoly capital accumulation.

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1. Introduction

At about the time when *The Oxford History of South Africa* (Wilson and Thompson 1969, Vol. I) was published, started a polemic regarding the liberal-radical nature of South African historiography (Wright 1977; Saunders 1988; Smith 1988; Visser 2004).

This debate (and others before the 1970s) tackled 'the problem of the relations between modern South African racial policy and economic development' (Wright 1977: 3). The history and outcome of that controversy is not the focus here, but rather the view that after more than two decades of African National Congress (ANC) rule, South Africans still seem to be at the same juncture in terms of their socio-political historical interpretations and material conditions.

Since the negotiated settlement of the political dispensation in the country in the early 1990s and following the post-1994 elections, the ANC was bestowed political power as it struggled to clear the way for a better future South Africa. From this is new black leadership emerged as a modern bourgeoisie. Two and a half decades later, the contemporary South African politics is infested with self-serving 'leadership' with an over-confident entitlement for self-reward for 'the years of toil in attaining liberation for the native people' (Siboto 2018).

Measured against its Freedom Charter, the myth of having achieved freedom clearly highlights how the ANC has failed in its distant once *haute* ideals. The major failure was to transform itself from a 'liberation' or 'freedom'-seeking party, to a 'governing' party. Once the ANC *neo*-elite took up their positions in the new socio-political society, they fed their stomachs, filled their garages, wardrobes and bank accounts. As a result, the ANC myth of 'for *all* people' became clear: the majority vote benefitted only a few citizens – similar to what happened in most instances in post-colonial Africa. For example, the ANC is using land expropriation without compensation as a drawcard to attract votes. Siboto (2018) wrote: 'black political leadership does not care for the poor black marginalised. What blacks are good for and worthy of, are free food parcels and black, gold and green t-shirts during the elections period that mask the inadequacies of real transformation policies'. For our purposes here, VBS [Mutual] Bank is a 'spectacular failure of black corporate governance'. It is a clear example that '[b]lack political leadership today does not fulfil the mandate of the struggle for liberty. It is abusing the poor for self-gratification' (Siboto 2018). This summary highlights the complexity of African politics in general, and the world as seen through the eye of the ANC needle.

Disadvantaged South Africans under ANC rule can rightfully make the normative claim that the country should never have fallen into the hands of the ANC and hopefully will never into that of the EFF. It is abundantly clear, they could argue, what expropriation without compensation and nationalising of banks means because it is clear how both are practised. The problem for the ANC and EFF is that no human past behaviour can ever be undone, because simply put: they cannot work with monopoly capital. The result: both parties are on trial in the eyes of the electorate and those still too

young to vote 'but who know'. Whilst some loot the South African centres of accumulated capital, the president and a few aids travel the global capital purses asking for capital investment.

It is therefore not inconceivable that Liberal and Africanist historical interpretations are today as apart from consensus as they 'were in the early 1970s. This does not imply that historiographical approaches are in any way homogeneous or even that historical interpretations ought to be in agreement. Historical interpretations question if Liberal and Africanist categories are still of any relevance today. This situation certainly highlights the extent to which those guilty of 'wokeness' restrict careful understanding and objective analysis that precedes any historical problem solving (Pelser 2018: 6). In this country, populist political rhetoric seems prone to this shortcoming. What is clear is that South African corruption is closely related to but not necessarily only caused by historical and ongoing institutionalised socio-economic imbalances.

Most recent debate argues that we today live in the 'Age of Capital' (Hobsbawm 2000), not in the Holocene (0,01 mya), Pleistocene (1,8 mya) (Maud in Lewis 2008: 3) or any other geological epoch, but in the *Capitalocene*, in other words the late capital period. The concept *Capitalocene*, rivals thinking by Crutzen and Stoermer (2000: 17–18) who proposed the concept *Anthropocene* at the beginning of this century. The leading proponent of the *Capitalocene* concept is J.W. Moore who advocates *Capitalocene* to *Anthropocene* because the latter does not describe the variables in modern-day life comprehensively enough. Important as they might be, biospheric changes do not describe 'it all'. In fact, the *Anthropocene* is restrictive to being atmospheric (Moore 2016: xi) in its focus. Instead, Moore (2017: 187–191) continues,

> '[o]urs is an era of epochal planetary transition' because '[c]apitalism – a dynamic crystallization of capital, power, and nature […] is now generalizing what it's always have been for some: an intergenerational system of mass murder.'

Two recent South African examples will illustrate this point. Firstly, if there are two concepts that are arguably most annoying to the ruling ANC, it is probably 'colonialism' and 'white monopoly capital' (WMC). At the outset it must be made clear that the ANC prefers to use the qualification 'white' monopoly capital as if no 'black' monopoly capital exists. The distinction between capitalisms, depends on the audience.

Widespread strikes against the ongoing lack of service delivery across large parts of South African communities in post-1994 South Africa, increasingly place attention on the rising tide of mass struggles against the *ANC-capitalist state*. For many South Africans, the current economic crises in the country – now in a technical recession – aim to achieve a renewed life of capitalist prosperity and stability because of the ANC's failed economics post-1994. The comparison to 'super Afrikaners' who held the power in everything that matters' (O'Meara 1983: 2) is a sufficient bench mark to

investigate the role of the ANC's 'premier league' that perpetuates the contradictions between 'a better life for *all* people' vs ANC-capitalism.

> 'The struggle between the exploited and exploiting classes is never simply a question of contending homogenous armies raged against each other in a battle for supremacy. Rather, it rages at all levels and interstices of society and takes many forms, both spontaneous and organised' (O'Meara 1983: 2).

It is therefore doubtful if any historical interpretation in South African historiography will achieve a reasonable level of consensus during the remainder of this century.

2. A Political party on trial: its colonialism, monopoly capital, corruption and lack of trust

The discussion about colonialism and monopoly capital's direct or indirect possible or potential relevance for the purposes herein, stem immediately from the results of fraudulent and corrupt practices on the everyday lives of ordinary South Africans. Civic mobilisations of 'taking to the streets' seem to be only partially successful, if at all, to resolve the crises of the current ANC policies.

Yet, the ANC's ambivalence about both is glaring. It stems from the party's ideological limitations. Privilege, of *some* black and white people, capital, in the hands of *some* black and white people, and corruption, perpetrated by *some* black and white people, did not just one morning appear from nowhere – they are all human creations and colour blind. In addition, the Economic Freedom Fighters' (EFF) MP, Floyd Shivambu's recent 'nativist politics' (Mkhabela 2018) has widely been condemned as being part of the problem of increasing tense race relations amongst *some* political groupings in the country, rather than contributing to a solution towards achieving a harmonious society for *all* who live in the country. Since then, Shivambu and the EFF have been widely criticized for their blatant race utterances. In fact, such populist speak seems to border on 'black chauvinism'. . The examples of the EEF are included to that of ANC's because in many cases the EEF supports the ANC in parliament to ensure a two thirds majority political outcome.

Blade Nzimande, South African Communist Party (SACP) general secretary, told delegates on 18 September 2018 at the SACP's national congress, exactly this. According to him

> 'reactionary tendencies […] should not be allowed to find space in our movement, like tribalism, black chauvinism and racist slurs and rampant incidents of patronage, mismanagement and corruption that has been normalised' (Mahlakoana 2018).

The ANC's own disposition towards colonialism and white monopoly capital also reminds of the failed attempts of achieving 'An Independent South African Native Republic' by the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) during the second half of the 1920s but that was abandoned by 1935 (Legassick 2007: 157–182; Pike 1988). In addition, the history of the SACP shows that its internal contradictions (Ludi 2011), be they ideological, class, or relative position to capital, and it has never been resolved (Ludi 2011: 48).

Historically, such populist sloganeering sparked and continues to give rise to divergent historical interpretations and conclusions. Instead, they have been polarising some communities in the country. On 25 June 2018, EFF leader Julius Malema 'defended his comments that the majority of Indian people are racist' […] as well as saying that 'some black journalists are house "n#!@*rs"' (Mitchley 2018). Both Shivambu and Malema (amongst others) do so on the basis of a subaltern argument that 'blacks apparently cannot be racist'. Any similar belief perpetuates 'false consciousness' and is tantamount to what Max Horkheimer (2004) termed an 'eclipse of reason'. Neither reverse racism nor discrimination at the hands of political gangsterism is the focus in this paper.

The following is a simplified outline for analysis of the complex contemporary South African state:


ANC-capitalism as a specific societal ecology
ANC's state capture = highest stage of ANC's systematic colonialism
Two-state South African state
Centres of surplus accumulated monopoly capital
of the
through the

Figure 1. Relative positioning of elements of the ANC's two-state South African state, its colonialism and affinity for monopoly capital in the Capitalocene.

The central theme of this article is that *the ANC has systematically colonised the country* depriving *all South Africans* of material wealth – a view juxtaposed to the uncritical belief that white people stole the land from black people. Of course, there is no sense in denying past practices of land theft. In

addition the ANC and EFF *cannot* distance themselves from their historical need of monopoly capital. Such false consciousness does not withstand rational scrutiny. In other words, WMC is bad, but monopoly capital remains lucrative for appropriation. There are at least two examples: the *highest stage of ANC colonisation is its state capture* in order to fulfil the hunger for their 'time to eat' desire, whilst the EFF has a dream to nationalise the South African banks for the same reasons.

Despite Harrison Wright's views in the mid-1970s, the impact of race relations and economic development of 'distant past events still seems significant' today (Wright 1975: 4). This renewed relevance is pushed high up on the historiographical agenda. One example is the ANC's recent announcement on 31 May 2018 to make history teaching at South African schools from Grade 10 to Grade 12 compulsory from 2023 onwards (Umraw 2018) – this after having marginalized history teaching, especially in minority-language state schools for more than a decade now. In other words, the old truism of history being that of the victor's, remains.

One of the fundamental characteristics of political parties and their leaders is the precarious reality of trust. As is seen later, lack of trust in former president Jacob Zuma dates back to at least 1979. In this regard, former minister of intelligence, Ronnie Kasrils (2017: 26) recently wrote:

> 'You comrades might not be aware that Joe Slovo and Joe Modise dissolved an MK structure he [Zuma] commanded in Maputo in 1979 because they were unhappy with the way he [Zuma] was working and withholding reports.'

A few instances of a lack of trustworthiness and apparent complicity are worth mentioning. The first is the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's 1998-report that 'the ANC had indeed been responsible for "various human rights abuses" of its own members in exile, many of which were committed by the ANC's security department that was established in the mid-1970s' (Gordin 2009: 35). Zuma was one of those 'leaders' censured by the Motsuenyane Commission – for 'failing to supervise properly the investigation into David Mbatha, an elderly ANC member and father of nine children', who was detained by the ANC and 'beaten repeatedly on his bare feet' (Gordin 2009: 36). Gordin (2009: 36) continues: 'Another better known case in which Zuma was implicated – because he was then head of counter-intelligence – was the death of Muziwakhe Ngwenya, better known as Thami Zulu'. The finger for TZ's death pointed 'directly at the ANC security department, headed by the late Joe Nhlanhla, Jacob Zuma and Sizakelele Sigxashe. Many newspaper reports strongly suggested that Hani was actually pointing a finger at Zuma' (Gordin 2009: 36–37). The last and most recent example is minister of finance Nhlanhla Nene's admission at the Zondo commission of inquiry on state capture, 'to "gross oversight" in not speaking up earlier about his secret trysts with the Guptas' (Munusamy and Kgosana 2018: 1; HORATH 2018: 5; Munusamy 2018: 6; Mashego and Speckman 2018: 1; Derby 2018: 2; Dreyer 2018: 13–14; *news24*: 2018). The most spectacular is the

unfolding of events following the Reserve Bank's investigation and report released on 10 October 2018 into VBS Mutual Bank (Motau 2018). The report

> '[r]ecommended that more than 50 individuals be criminally charged and held liable in civil proceedings, following the bank's implosion earlier this year. This includes the bank's former executives, shareholder executives, politicians and their relatives and auditors who signed off on the bank's "fraudulent" financials' (Evans 2018).

And since the ANC can also not be trusted on the basis of Zuma having been ANC president and president of the country (Bruce 2014: 49) – a view often expressed by all South Africans in social media – the question then arises: why should the ANC be trusted with promoting objective historical *praxis* at South African schools? After all, the ANC failed its own press censorship attempts before. The best example is that of the so-called SABC 8 journalists who were fired by the broadcaster in July 2016 because they protested against the SABC's editorial policy. At the time the corporation had taken a unilateral decision not to broadcast visual material of 'violent service delivery-related protests' that are ongoing in the country. Instead, what was expected from these journalists, was what Van Onselen (2014: 130) termed 'patriotic reporting'. According to these eight employees

> 'the media will always be under attack [by government]. So, we need to be vigilant and take deliberate steps to defend the freedom of the media because, in effect, we are defending democracy' (TMO Reporter 2017).

Soon afterwards, the court ruled in their favour and the journalists were reinstated at the SABC.

This article argues that *the ANC has an insatiable propensity for capital* (fashionably labelled as 'white monopoly capital', whilst it is actually *all* monopoly capital) *and has therefore purposely colonised* (the popular term is 'captured') *the South African state*. The implication therefore, is that the ANC distinguishes between various forms of accumulated capital and variants of colonialism. To this end the ANC had a motive and the means.

But just *how insatiable is the ANC's lust for monopoly capital*? One known example will remind the readers about the length the ANC would go to lay their hands on monopoly capital. Judge Johann Kriegler wrote in his Forward to *Rogue. The Inside Story of SARS's Elite Crime-busting Unit*:

> '[t]here was a discernible pattern – discernible across a number of public institutions – where key individuals, experienced, reputable and independent-minded public servants, have been cynically shunted aside, or out. Typically, the process starts with some or other alleged transgression, relatively trivial

> and/or outdated. That then triggers well-publicised suspension and disciplinary proceedings with concomitant humiliation, harassment and, ultimately, dismissal, constructive or actual. Then, with breathtaking speed, a hand-picked acting successor steps in and cleans out senior management; and when you look again there's a brand-new crop of compliant and grateful faces' (Kriegler in Van Loggerenberg with Lackey 2016: xvi).

From a historical perspective, the ANC's affinity for monopoly capital and desire to 'capture' South Africa started long before 1994. Admittedly, it is questionable if at the outset, *the highest form of ANC colonialism*, being that of *state capture*, was the end-goal. Within historical processes of systematic ANC colonialism and its disposition towards capitalist *praxis* in democratic South Africa, the party has failed the tests of its own constitutional democracy or any form of maintaining the moral high ground in the country. Many references have previously been made that the ANC has lost its moral compass. *It is dubious today if the ANC has in effect achieved freedom of any kind for all South Africans* – a view often widely expressed by ordinary South Africans when appearing in on-location television interviews – *viz.* that they now simply live under just another hegemonic state.

It is common knowledge that a large percentage of South Africans still do not enjoy socio-economic 'freedom' as is reflected in the widening gap between rich and poor – popularly described as the widest in the world. Despite this, the ANC continues on a 'one dimensional' level (Marcuse 1966) of analysis to blame the legacy of apartheid *and* WMC for the country's degeneration. The current technical economic recession that was announced in September 2018, and the ever-increasing unemployment situation in the country, is in fact more and more *directly* attributed to state capture as well as systemic government and SOE-fraud.

Secondly, the historical objectives of political 'freedom' for all South Africans, seems impossible considering the Tripartite Alliance's 'checkmate relationship' (between the ANC, SACP and Cosatu) and the daily disruptive influences of this alliance on the normal functioning of civic society. The practice of strikes and the disruptive influences thereof on ordinary life and daily economic activities, have reached such proportions that Monga Phaladi (secretary-general of Nafcoc) is of the view that 'a moratorium on all disruptive action until the economy is growing sustainably at least 3%', be put in place (Phaladi 2018).

In what follows, the argument is that the post-1994 ANC state has in effect created a state-within-a-state. Basson and Du Toit (2017: xii) described this as 'effectively a parallel state' with parallel structures (Bruce 2014: 58). This leads to the existence of a two-state South African state. Traditional development/under-development theory of the 1970s and 1980s, used terminology such as 'core' or 'metropole' and 'periphery' to describe metropole centres of development and outlying periphery centres of underdevelopment in the hinterland thereof. For the purposes in this article,

> '"Development" is 'a sustained strengthening of productive capacities and market integration to both "underdevelopment" – the decline of these elements in the economy – or "growth without development" – a simple expansion of the exploitation of existing resources through existing means' (Austen, 1987: 1).

But today a new language is required – one that recognizes that the 'South African state simply does not have the skills or capacity to manage' (Corrigan 2018) mega-scale resources or associated projects. Both are the result of its own failed socio-economic policies. The current proposed National Health Insurance scheme and the monthly pay-outs of state social grants are clear examples. Instead, the state's 'responsibilities' and bureaucrats' promised and sworn undertakings to govern 'to the best of their abilities', extended into corrupt societal creeping that systematically clawed away at dispossessing the citizenry of their hard-earned monies – their taxes. In so-doing continue to deprive all South Africans in one form or another of their much-needed working capital. Taxes, after all, provide for the very services many South Africans want for free: e.g. free housing, free education, free health care, free access on roads, food products exempt from Value Added Tax, or public taxi transport exempted from paying toll-fees, etc. As a result, the opposite of a so-called 'better South Africa for *all* South Africans' rhetoric was the outcome: the creation of an intensely, *neo*-capitalised ANC élite at the expense of the rest of civic society. This means that '[f]or many people in South Africa, declarations such as these by the ANC and its representatives, are highly incongruous' (Bruce 2014: 49). Flowing from this, K. Hart and V. Padayachee (2013) described, this South African élite as 'a new black bourgeoisie'.

It is doubtful if in the new post-1994 two-state South African state – characterised by its core-state (or metropole) and periphery-state – the South African working class (Engelbrecht 2015: 1–48; Engelbrecht 2018a: 1–23) with its apparent socialist ideals, ever broke away from capital. Rather, the converse seems more likely. The *haute* ANC bourgeois élite well understands that the lower the development of the labourer is the more limited the volume and of less economic value their products are. As a result, the more limited the collective wealth of society is, the more the social order is dominated by 'kinship groups' in government in order to enrich itself. But it also means that one can make the have-nots socio-economically dependent through populist rhetoric with promises of a better life. This means that historically (from the last quarter of the 19th century), the ideological ideals of both workers and capital, served their respective material interests differently, that is, *away* from *socialism* – 'as instruments of a will to power' (Steinmetz 2018: 12), *away* from *apartheid-capitalism*, *towards* a new capitalism – *ANC-capitalism*. In other words, the ANC has succeeded in what Ronald Niezen (2018: 2) called, although in a different context

> 'in redefining the concept of hegemony […] by taking it beyond the realm of politico-military domination of one state over another and extending its

> meaning to include the ideological predominance of a ruling class that manipulates the value and world view of the rules as a way to legitimate existing forms of power'.

The question therefore posed to the 2018-South African state is this: to do what with its new-found power? Over time, the answer has become clearer than ever before: to 'manage' the state's scarce resources for self-interest. More accurately is the theme of Jeremy Cronin's (deputy general secretary South African Communist Party) paper delivered in early August 2012 at a symposium on corruption. The essence of his analysis was that the state institutions have 'been structured to be looted' (Cronin 2012: 1–13). In short, the restructuring of the post-apartheid society now appears to have had very little to do with improving the material conditions by the ANC of *all South Africans*. Instead, and for this reason, state kleptocrats (*handlangers*) move from one centre of surplus accumulated monopoly capital to another in order to be able to continue with their own surplus accumulation extracted from monopoly capital (as opposed to *white* monopoly capital only). In this process, the ANC bourgeois new élite's new-found 'wealth' was 'purchased at a dehumanizing cost' (Kiernan in Engels 2005: 12), meaning, at the expense of everyone else in society. Historical studies of political economics based on this clearly concluded that this practise is not sustainable. The historical contradictions are as follow: 'State-owned enterprises collectively had a R360bn budget and were expected to play a role in the government's R50bn plan to boost the economy' but 'in many SOE's costs had increased because corruption is rampant, and this places a limit on the contribution these entities could make. "In many of our entities … you are paying double or treble for things"' (Speckman 2018: 8).

In this respect, although in a different context, the words of J.W. Moore (2015: 1) are pertinent:

> '[w]e may be experiencing not merely a transition from one phase of capitalism to another, but something more epochal: the breakdown of the strategies and relations that have sustained capital accumulation over the past five centuries'.

A few years ago, Pikoli and Wiener wrote about an incident of material self-interest in the ANC that Pikoli remembers well. The implication is that *strategies and relations* in the ANC have deteriorated to the extent that the normative base of the ANC has been compromised. The story goes that by early February 1990 when State President F.W. de Klerk

> 'stood up in parliament and made the speech that changed our lives' […) 'I was asked to sit on a committee that was looking at the extent of the ANC's assets in light of the fact that we would all be going home to South Africa. The party had many houses and cars in Zimbabwe so our treasurer-general, Comrade Thomas

> Nkobi, asked me to be part of the group that would audit the assets with the assistance of a team of lawyers.
>
> Controversially, I resigned and left the committee midway through its work, simply because I felt that one or two of the people I was working with on the Committee were not honest. There were properties I knew about that were not being declared and I started asking about the other ANC assets that weren't being recorded. I knew for a fact that there were farms, houses, cars and other assets that hadn't being disclosed and I'm sure some individual members of the ANC benefited at the time – not only in Zimbabwe but in Tanzania, Angola and other places.'(Pikoli and Wiener 2013: 91–92).

> 'There were promises of houses being built for us, as well as all sorts of other promises made to MK soldiers – few of which were ever fulfilled. We were used to receiving handouts from the ANC […] As in any struggle of liberation movement, there are always the élite that come in the form of those who were educated and are working in departments that could organise jobs for themselves' (Pikoli and Wiener 2013: 95).

With regards the disposition to organise jobs, two recent random instances come to mind. In 2017 Brian Molefe, former Eskom CEO, was appointed in the Army as a colonel. In the same year Nomula Mokonyane under whose watch the department of water affairs collapsed, was redeployed at the communication portfolio (Schoeman 2018). These examples are contrary to the ANC's many promises that it is a 'listening organisation' and that it is in the process of 'cleaning itself up' in terms of its organisational behaviour. Instead, blame is often placed on 'capitalism's ability to self-regulate' while the reality is that trade unions' 'complicity in the political battles of its alliance partner – the ANC' (Khumalo 2018: 13) are constantly under discussion.

Such practices are neither fair nor democratic. But today, with centres of accumulated capital within reach of many ANC bourgeois élite, they being 'individuals and groups in close "proximity to power"' (Bruce 2014: 57), not many would be willing to resign for the sake of the country's future let alone in in the name of ethical politics. In this regard Crispina Olver (2017: 9) wrote what has been said may times before: 'For some years, I had watched from the sidelines, with increasing alarm, as the party we'd all fought so hard to bring to power lost its moral compass and began to tear itself apart'. The contention is that for decades now, the contemporary South African material world is experiencing a different materialist driving force: *ANC-capitalism.* This new *praxi*s has colonised South African society as a *new* brand of capitalism that is vastly *different* from *apartheid-capitalism.* From this perspective, the principle is that a 'variety of South African capitalisms' can be established (Hart and Padayachee 2013: 57) in the two-state South African state.

The argument was previously made (Engelbrecht 2011: 1) that '[h]istorians cannot escape the instantaneous global flow of communication and information.' This implies that as long as humans survive, there will be no 'end of history' (Fukuyama 2006) on the horizon. To emphasize this view: there is no indication that either the South African working class, or ANC capitalism will soon wither away (Engels 2010) from society and therefore societal inequalities will also not disappear in the near future. Whilst on the one hand, according to Moore (2017), it seems more likely that capitalism will not last until 'the last tree has been cut', for others (again in Moore's view), it also seems more likely to envisage the end *of* the planet than the disappearance of capitalism *from* the planet (Moore 2018: 2).

The ANC's creation and systematic colonisation (Engelbrecht 2012: 1–16) of the South African two-state state and its propensity for monopoly capital, clearly does not serve the needs of the country's people. It never did, and state capture, according to Mmusi Maimane (leader of the opposition) 'began not with [former] president [Jacob Zuma]. It begins when you deploy cadres to go and capture the state and you ask them to serve the organisation' (Fengu 2018). This means that ANC colonisation always benefitted, through the appropriation of the centres of accumulated profit – such as banks, provinces, cities, SOE's national treasury, and municipalities – the capital-needs of an élite ANC bourgeois minority. This is a similar point that Fanon (2001) made as far back as the early 1960s in respect of the failure of capitalism relative to the material well-being of the masses. Therefore, the contention is that the socio-economic and political equality claims that the ANC continues to make for more than 100 years now, have, since its inception, never been achieved and is tantamount to a false narrative *and* consciousness. They are not mutually exclusive. There are currently also no reasonable indications that ANC promises of material equality will be achieved in the next few decades. This seems impossible based on the current population growth of 1,7%, an economic growth of only 0,7% and the rising unemployment rate currently at 27,7% or 9 million people of the total population.

The above suggests that *history is never over* since there is always a certain level of historical continuity. This is also true of the history of colonialism; the history of the rise of capitalism, empire and imperialism; the history of post-colonial systemic fraud and corruption; the history of the rise of the so-called wretched of Africa against all things European and capital; and the history of numerous failed African ideological freedom struggle *praxes*. Furthermore, as recently as May 2018, Gerber (2018) quoted Democratic Alliance (DA) leader, Mmusi Maimane, who said: 'We are victims of a failing liberation movement that has no choice but to cling to the past because it has no credible plan for the future.' The view of Ronnie Kasrils is worth taking note of. He wrote:

> '…Mbeki built on the compromises the ANC had felt it had to accept in the pre-democracy negotiations to consolidate acceptance of a largely market-driven liberal economy. While there was a need for stability in the traumatic

> 1990- period, some had argued that this no longer applied by 1996 when the pro-market Gear (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) programme was instituted. The quest was no longer one of maintaining stability because of the political violence and tensions. Instead, the rationale became economic issues' (Kasrils 2017: 27).

Since Ramaphosa's inauguration as president, 'Radical (sometimes 'Revolutionary') Economic Transformation' became the new slogan. Such populist sloganeering is in line with historical tendencies in post-colonial African political *praxis.*

This is an important conclusion because nearly always, political leaders, and president Ramaphosa in particular, in public appearances and in parliament, cannot withstand the opportunity to first take a swipe at the *apartheid* past at some point in a speech or interview, but at the same time preaches healing and national reconciliation from the ills of a colonial and apartheid history. The counter-productiveness of this habit is in the public domain for some to see and for others who fail to realize. Particularly problematic are the difference between often used references to '*all* people of South Africa' as opposed to '*all our* people of South Africa'.

More problematic for presidential and ANC party strategy, is president Ramaphosa's startling answer to a question about race relations in the country to a group of editors during a briefing with the South African National Editors' Forum (Sanef) in Cape Town. On 24 May 2018 he said that one of the ANC's biggest weaknesses is that fact that *the ANC has lost its 'non-racial character'* (*news24* 2018. Emphasis added). This has far reaching implications for the arguments herein and those previously made because it points to an un-researched theme of an ANC 'false consciousnesses in the party's historiography. One implication is that the historical claim by the ANC to be seeking a better life for *all* South Africans is therefore compromised. A week later, on 31 May 2018, during a meeting at Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu's home in Hermanus, president Ramaphosa apologized to Tutu for the fact

> 'that the Archbishop was put through a tough and unfair time where he had lost confidence in the ANC's leadership and the President expressed regret for that. During the apartheid era, Tutu prayed that the government at the time would fall. Losing faith in the ANC, Tutu had the same approach to his disappointment of the government. In 2011 he then again prayed that the ANC too would fall' (Herbst 2018).

The question as to why such presidential apology has not been made to *all* citizens of the country remains unanswered.

But just who are the movers and shakers in the ANC's two-state state with its propensity for monopoly capital? They are, as previously described (Engelbrecht 2018b: 1–14), that privileged, powerful élite group of people that has gone rogue and steal scarce resources from the country and its *entire* people. They are invisible, corrupt-*able* and corrupt-*ing* people who were groomed and recruited from all walks of life – mainly *haute* and *petty* kleptocrats that form networks of illegal *trading communities* with unethical relations in and between State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and other centres of accumulated monopoly capital. Former Northwest premier, Supra Mahumapelo's son, Supra Oarabile Mahumapelo, was irregularly awarded a study bursary of R1,1 million by the SOE, Denel, to become a student pilot at 43 Air School in Port Alfred. Mahumapelo's brother, Tau, was awarded a security tender, also by Denel. Then, 'Zwelakhe Ntshepe, the chief executive officer [at Denel], who signed off the bursary, resigned for "personal reasons" last month [May 2018], shortly before the matter made headlines' (Gibson 2018).

But why SOEs? The simplistic answer is: because SOEs are the accumulation and distribution centres of surplus monopoly capital. These parastatal companies *deal in* or *trad*e *with* state-sponsored, institutionalized systemic fraud and corruption. The individuals involved are in the final analysis, former president Zuma's keepers – a faceless, nameless bunch of people behind and around him that played a fundamental role to have kept him in power and protected him from his day in court and potentially years out of jail. 'All sorts of […] unsuitable people were appointed directly by former president Zuma, and by others under his watch within our country's institutions – including foreign missions' (Moeng 2018). They are the appointees who neglect the poor people of the country and who stand in the way of their development (Hart and Padayachee 2013: 62) long before, and after, the 'New Dawn' was announced by president Ramaphosa. That was, until president Zuma resigned – (something that Zuma always claimed he would never wilfully do of his own accord) on the evening of 14 February 2018 only thirteen months after he fired former Finance Minister, Pravin Gordhan at the end of March 2017. In the case of Nelson Mandela Bay, Olver (2017: 13–14) wrote:

> '...Maria told me about a web of corruption that worked on multiple levels. Pulling the strings were ANC regional politicians, mainly from a faction knows as the Stalini group, who controlled the metro Council. Abetting the corruption was a set of powerful, strategically positioned city officials and political staffers, whose real bosses were not the City manager or the Mayor, but rather ringleaders outside government. Indeed, some of these officials, who had first operated on behalf of the party bosses, had become free agents controlling their own corrupt networks, diverting public money into their own pockets.'

With regards to Zuma, Kasrils (2017: 29) had placed on record: 'As revolutionaries we should be in the fore, taking him [Zuma] to task as a corrupt and immoral leader and consequently the corrupter

of others.' DA leader, Mmusi Maimane's scope is broader. He summarized cause and effect in the history of the above, as follows: 'deployment to the boards of state-owned enterprises lead to "grand theft". *The project of state capture is not a Jacob Zuma project. It's the ANC's project'* (Fengu 2018. Emphasis added.) About this question – a life of material self-enrichment – the German philosopher Friedrich Engels quoted Lewis Henry Morgan, (an American evolutionary anthropologist with a simple theory of progressive development of human society) (Hunt in Engels 2010: 4) as follows:

> 'The interests of society are paramount to individual interests, and the two must be brought into just and harmonious relations. A mere property career is not the final destiny of mankind. […] The dissolution of society bids fair to become the termination of a career of which property is the end and aim; because such a career contains the elements of self-destruction' (Engels 2010: 217).

Morgan's sentiments are applicable to Zuma *and* the ANC. For Kasrils there was no question: 'Zuma has become the role model of those who say it's our time to eat' (Kasrils 2017: 30). Whilst Zuma destroyed himself *and* many others through the pursuits of his 'property career' (or surplus accumulation career), numerous commentators agree that the 2019 elections will pronounce harshly on the future direction of the life-history of the ANC and for many people closely associated with the ANC.

In the current historical situation of South Africa, the ANC and Zuma's deeply embroiled political, financial and social scandals span almost three decades. Their behaviour – and they are not mutually exclusive – is instantaneously visible for the whole world to see. Their 'social existence determines consciousness' (Steinmetz 2018: 12) – a consciousness of being able and well-positioned (Bruce 2014) to purposefully networking the illegal and corrupted economy and practices for self-enrichment. As a result, the ANC currently faces the historical reality that for many decades to come, countless book shelves about its post-'modern' 'liberation' historiography will be filled with diverse historical interpretations of its most shameful historical past of its first 25 years of 'democratic rule'. From a historical perspective, both concepts 'democratic' and 'rule' are viewed as contradictions in terms of lived experiences under ANC and Zuma rule respectively. Madonsela for instance, is of the view that 'democracy literacy' is needed amongst students 'so that no longer will they be "conned" by corrupt political leaders' […] The students at Walter Sisulu University who cheered Zuma recently did so because "they don't understand how democracy works" (Barron 2018: 15).

In a sense, that '[h]istory will judge them [Zuma and the ANC] for this' (Basson and Du Toit 2017: xii), has already begun. The pendulum of initial ANC historiography, once in awe of its freedom-making world, has already swung towards a new and highly critical understanding of its problematic contemporary historical consciousness (Pretorius 2014: 14) and *praxis*.

Some serving ANC members and parliamentarians themselves have publically admitted that the ANC of today is only but a fraction of what it used to be, or professed to be. When such traditional historical claims of a once 'glorious' organisation (in their view) are (were) made, questions now arise if that was the case in the first instance? For some students, this suggests that the ANC's past is currently questioned in mythological terms. Some argue that this is the only democratic government we have ever known, but not the one what South Africans voted for and certainly not what the organization has led civil society to believe the ANC has been for more than a century. Incidentally, during the last decades of the 20th century, the German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, was deeply concerned about the 'disillusionment with democracy' – today, many millions of South Africans are also disillusioned by ANC 'democracy'. South Africans are on record, having stated this in public and at the polls. There are two indicators for this: the unexpectedly reduced lower support of the ANC in the 2016 municipal elections, and secondly, the continuous and widespread service delivery protests against all levels of inept governing.

Recently, Victoria Brittain opened her 'Foreword' to Ronnie Kasrils's book *A Simple Man. Kasrils and the Zuma Enigma*, as follows: 'This is the story of the hidden death of a beloved African *myth*' (Brittain in Kasrils 2017: ix. Emphasis added) – a myth, for the purpose herein – that promised certain deliverables to South Africans. Promises, in original ANC language essentially meant: a better life for *all* South Africans, freedom from oppression, a *non*-racial, *non*-sexist society, one that now only remains an ideal. But in fact, this book also records

> 'how close comrades, having been involved in decades of struggle for immensely ambitions project of transformation, once in power made political choices which enriched a new class at home, made state patronage and corruption a new norm, and in foreign policy frequently evaded principle' (Brittain in Kasrils 2017: ix).

The ANC's international connections from before its formation are well-known. At the time a façade of occupying moral high-ground was put up. Against the background of modern globalization theory (Engelbrecht 2011: 1–15) the world has become a small village, struggling to sustain an ever growing population of more than 7 billion people with only one natural environment with its scarce non-renewable resources available to do so. As a result, in this global world, the ANC's South Africa is no different. Three cryptic examples underscore this point. South Africa 'enthusiastically participated in […] neoliberal globalisation that culminated in the current [post 2008] economic crisis' (Hart and Padayachee 2013: 57). The ANC 'came to power without coherent economic policies, relying rather on a belief in state power and abstract socialist rhetoric' (Hart and Padayachee 2013: 61). Lastly, 'through unchecked informality and criminalisation of the world economy at all levels, especially at the top' (Hart and Padayachee 2013: 73), in South Africa

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> ‘the beneficiaries of BEE [Black economic Empowerment] are a small élite, many with close links to the ruling party, some of them party officials, plus a few ex-trade unionists’ […]. An early example was the sale of Sanlam’s Metropolitan Life (Metlife) to a black consortium that included the Mandela family’s doctor and the secretary general of the ANC (Cyril Ramaposa)’ (Hart and Padayachee 2013: 76).

The claim is this: the ANC does not, because it cannot, authoritatively redistribute the scarce South African resources on behalf of the well-being of *all* South Africans as it professes to do. It has never done so. In addition, the ANC cannot function without capitalism, neither does it wants to. Without capitalism the ANC cannot exist and does not have an ideological base. The same is true for the SACP: should capital miraculously vanish, then so does the ideological base of the SACP. Both myths that it would, have been dispelled – in fact, from even before the founding history of the ANC it is clear that its historical existence is precisely *because* of capital. The roots if its history date back to the 1870s – more than four decades before the ANC came into existence, to the early but rapid formation of mining capital. Similarly, the Communist Party of South Africa’s failed program towards establishing an ‘Independent South African Native Republic’ with ‘guarantees for the rights of the white minority’ during the late 1920s onwards (Legassick 2007: 157), does not stand independently from the realities of capital of its time. In essence, it is argued here, political ideology exists *in* and *because of* capital as a world-ecology.

Daily press reports on current ANC *praxis* and the staggering revelations about various social media platforms clearly show, with the help of immediate and massive social media flows of that information, that ‘[a] spectre is haunting’ (Marx and Engels 2002: 218) South Africa – the spectre of undressing the ANC and its propensity for monopoly capital in public – for all South Africans and the entire world to see (Brittain in Kasrils 2017: ix). The following two examples illustrate this point: the behaviour of ANC parliamentarians in general and specifically Zuma’s, reflects an *un-enlightened understanding* of most modern-day expectations in South African (Van Onselen 2014: Engelbrecht 2013a) and the international world, of a modern democratic state. This is manifested in Zuma’s ‘inability to distinguish such things’ Van Onselen (2014: 71) wrote. Furthermore, the

> ‘startling thought: that the [then] president of our country does not understand corruption; that he thinks there is nothing wrong with letting Schabir Shaik fund his lifestyle while promoted Shaik’s business interests on the side; and that Zuma, once the head of the National Aids Council, thought it was okay to continue to have unprotected sex, even after his public apology to the nation for doing so following his infamous 2006 rape trial’ (Basson 2012: 133).

During an interview with *Sunday Times,* former KwaZulu-Natal premier Senzo Mchunu said: 'after three meetings with Zuma he [Mchunu] had concluded that the former president was unable to distinguish right from wrong' (Matiwane, Z. 2018: 4), seemingly 'incapable of understanding the moral landscape' (Van Onselen 2014: xviii). This is no different from Jackie Selebe's fall from grace as former national commissioner of the South African Police Service, president of the African National Congress Youth League (1987–1991) and former president of Interpol (2004–2008), being convicted for corruption and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment on 3 August 2010.

According to Van Onselen (2014: xvii) Zuma is essentially 'a traditional man at odds with the requirements of a modern democracy.' The same observation is true of the ANC. As a diverse party in a contesting alliance, gatekeeping and re-deployment of officials are simple methods to side-line qualified contestants for positions of party and state power. This has plagued the ANC from is founding days more than a century ago. In modern-day ANC politics, throwing stones and other forms of taking laws into own hands, from necklacing to property destruction, collapsing public, municipal, provincial and parliamentary meetings, are all common practices in South African's 'constitutional democracy.' The most publicised example is magistrate Morne Cannon's judgement that ANC councillor, Andile Lungisa, has unlawfully and intentionally hit former MMC for transport, Rayno Kayser, a DA Councillor, over the head with a glass water jug and without provocation during a heated council meeting in October 2016. He was sentenced to two years in jail (Koen 2018).

The second example is this: president Ramaphosa answered in parliament on 24 May 2018 that

> 'before that (the leaked emails) it looked like isolated incidents... at Eskom and elsewhere, but when the Gupta emails came out, it was clear that the wheels were coming off completely' (Basson and Mahlase 2018).

As a result of the scope of these revelations, hardly a day goes by that all forms of South African journalistic spaces do not carry stories about blatant fraud and systemic corruption in South Africa and how Zuma and the ANC are at the centre of these illegal economic trading activities – *actions that have been termed crimes against the South African humanity* – and that should be treated as such by the international justice system (Engelbrecht 2013b; Engelbrecht 2016). In such society, heightened intolerance prevails.

When Helen Zille tweeted on Twitter on 14 March 2017:

> '[f]or those claiming legacy of colonialism was ONLY negative, think of our independent judiciary, transport infrastructure, piped water',

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the DA leader, Maimane, went into a state of poorly thought through process of pronouncements whilst the ANC fended off a number of uncontrolled attacks amongst some of its leaders for their reactions. The EFF on the other hand, ignorant of how to respond in a balanced and politically mature manner, reacted with traditional anti-intellectual populist screaming, mainly by labelling the unfair world of capital and race around them. According to Du Preez (2018), the EFF's Julius Malema responded

> 'with typical bombastic Zuma-era speech with personal attacks, insults, threats and petty, cheap populist comments'. Over a period of a few months 'a series of statements by the EFF leaders on identity, race ethnicity, citizenship and language shows a party steeped in racial and ethnic chauvinism' (Mkhabela 2018).

Zille's tweet changed her political career and that of the political landscape for the DA. In fairness to Zille, Pelser (2018) argued that social media is hardly a space for democrats wanting to build a better world when he quoted University of Witwatersrand vice-chancellor, Adam Habib, as follows: 'To this mob, get off my account. It's for thoughtful democrats interested in building a better world.' In other words, the DA's antiquarianism, not towards colonialism and Zille being side-lined strategy, but about a lack of accommodating open debate. This no more narrow-minded than the ANC's intolerance in 1985 when it suspended and finally in 1989 expelled Martin Legassick from the party for putting forward socialist policies (Legassick 2007: xvii). Yet, historically, the ANC always had socialist, trade unionist and communist 'alliance' partners. More importantly, the date of Zille's tweet is significant. It happened in 2017 and not in the Middle Ages when people were murdered for their religious beliefs, nor under an authoritarian constitution such as Zimbabwe where gross human rights violations are common practice as recently as 2017, but in South Africa, with two and a half decades' experience in 'democracy' under a constitution that has widely been praised as seemingly the most liberal and all-inclusive in the world. In this regards, advocate Tembeka Ngcukaitobi (2018: 1) wrote as follows:

> 'South Africa's Constitution stands as a monument in the world. For Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a judge of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, it is not the Constitution of the United States of America that is a model for the world, but the South African Constitution. The magnitude of its vision and ambition is unprecedented.'

And still, the ANC and Zuma remain constantly at odds with the South African constitution and its alliance 'partners'.

Similarly, when DA parliamentarians disagreed with Maimane's comments that he made on Freedom Day (27 April 2018) about white privilege and black poverty, Maimane again simply side-lined his own senior party members' contributions to that debate. It is a practice often used by senior leaders in the ANC, DA and EFF alike. It resembles *woken* (Brooks 2018) behaviour. As a result, in recent weeks there is much speculation in the press that some senior DA members are contemplating to form a new break-away party, because the feeling is that the DA is no longer a truly liberal party.

Regardless of the truism that colonialism dates back to Ancient Greek and Roman days, practically all current nations practiced colonialism in one form or another. Of course, the emergence of the Zulu hegemonic state in the 19th century 'that served a nation-building purpose as well as a military one' (Denoon 1974: 17) or the Griqua hegemony in relation to the *Mfecane* (Legassick in Elphick and Giliomee 1980: 277), it is true that

> 'Africans in South Africa founded and operated nationalist movements and engaged in political protest on a country-wide scale earlier than Africans elsewhere on the continent, their share in the formal political process has actually decreased over time' (Leatt *et al*. 1986: 89).

And (at the time of writing) Morocco's continued occupation of Western Sahara remains an embarrassment for anti-colonial Africanists who tend to forget their own forms of intra-African colonialisms – some that can be traced back centuries ago. Even to this day, some of the best minds in the world are not in agreement of this phenomenon's history, characteristics and *praxis*. Yet, it is almost like the words 'imperialist' or 'globalization' or 'freedom' – everyone seems to instinctively know what they are. Often when disagreement in debate about these concepts sets in, one party is usually demoted to the ranks of the wretched of the earth – the popular South African term is 'poorest of the poor'. Historically, the standard response to disagreement is to be labelled a racist, or, in post-1994 political behaviour, the politics of 'shout-down' started. In more radical forms, the 'politics of the brick over that of the ballot' (Booysen in Mc Lennan and Munslow 2009: 136) takes over. There can hardly be any debate about this when the EFF's 'shout-down' behaviour in Parliament is a regular spectacle to be seen by the whole world. On Friday night, 8 June 2018, Gwede Mantashe, the national chairperson of the ANC was booed at the ANC KwaZulu-Natal provincial conference and prevented from delivering his address (Goba 2018). The result is that racial and cultural profiling in South Africa is not treated equally. *Woken* behaviour, Brooks (2018) argued, 'freezes' understanding.

One can reason that there is no consensus about what equality the ANC is. Zuma's view on 13 September 2012 in the National Assembly about the question of equality was the following:

> 'Sorry, we have more rights here because we are a majority. You have fewer rights because you are a minority. Absolutely, that's how democracy works' (Van Onselen 2014: 62).

Such one-dimensional ideological misunderstanding shuts out meaningful communication from opportunities of a better world-making in an open society and exposes its enemies (Popper 2008). This same principle is manifested in the German philosopher, Max Horkheimer's spring 1944 public lectures at Columbia University. Horkheimer (2004; v) wrote in 1946:

> 'Advance in technical facilities for *enlightenment* is accompanied by a process of *dehumanization*. Thus progress threatens to nullify the very goal it is supposed to realize – the idea of man.' (Emphasis added.)

For more than a century, South African historiography reveals that many a pen and printer cartridge has been emptied trying to answer the question: 'How did the few South African Whites acquire their power, and consequently become so important on the continent of Africa and in the international sphere?' (Muller in Muller 1986: xii). Today, the same question can be asked: How did a few ANC politicians and cadres, led by Zuma, became so powerful that they are accused of its own form of colonialism that eventually captured the South African state and its citizenry in order to acquire surplus monopoly capital? This is, some would argue, (yet again) a critical period in the history of South African post-apartheid democracy with the country on the brink of failure (Boraine 2014). This failure-narrative comes also authoritatively from many ANC parliamentarians who openly express concerns that *should the country's SOEs fail, the country could fail and the hard-fought democracy would disintegrate.* A further example will suffice. Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi called a media conference on 5 June 2018 'to try and reassure the nation that while the public health system was taking strain, it was far from collapsing' (Kahn 2018: 3).

The reality is that the ANC has been exposed, mainly by its own *praxes* – more often than not, even by its own parliamentarian supporters and inability to adhere to processes. Two examples will underline this point: all SOEs, the vast majority of local municipalities and a growing number of provinces are placed either under administration, or are subjected to intense processes of judicial inquiry. Secondly a number of ANC provinces have also be placed in the hands of the NEC. For instance, Treasury Director General, Dondo Mogajane, blamed weak political leadership and accountability for the financial woes of municipalities (Omarjee 2018). These examples underline the argument that the ANC was never ready to take on running the country or being capable to detach itself from freedom-struggle thinking despite its rhetorical claims and assurances to the contrary. This realization does not only date back to the early 1990s. There is an argument to be made out that such expectations might be irrationally high. In addition, the strategy of 'freedom now and the rest later'

has landed the citizenry in having neither freedom nor education. Similarly, the entitlement of 'time to eat' has resulted in the inability of the ANC to modernise itself since they were not *doing* that, instead, the ANC was busy with something else, as was Zuma. In essence, the central tenet of *enlightenment*, namely, that enlightenment 'which harbours the very promise of human emancipation' (Rasmussen in Rasmussen 1996: 23) became the antithesis of all forms of domination – human domination over nature and human donation over other humans, has not yet achieved philosophical traction.

But in the history of the ANC, this is not new. According to one reporter: 'The rot did not quickly come on its own like an attack of the flu. […] the ANC, still in power, allowed and enabled the rot' (Moeng 2018). The implication is that the 'ANC is in trial' – something that they deny at all cost. According to Boraine (2014: 4), 'Mbeki started the rot of deploying people into jobs for which they had no experience; as a result service delivery never matched the needs of the poorest of the poor.' This cannot be denied. In fact, on 21 May 2017, (then deputy president), Cyril Ramaphosa said in his SACP's Moses Kotana lecture in Rustenburg: "It's something that should make all of us sad, that the South Africa of Nelson Mandela is now said to be on the brink of becoming a mafia state" (Ramaphosa 2017). Ramaphosa then again called for a judicial inquiry into state capture. By March 2018, that investigation finally started.

Conclusion

South Africa has a long and well-documented history of Dutch and British colonialism dating back to 1652, followed by decades of apartheid rule. Corruption by pliable colonial officials, are however, less researched. The history and practices of corruption in South Africa are as old as the colonial history of the country. Johannes Meintjies (1975: 18) for instance, wrote about the Van Riebeeck-period: 'high-ranking officials, underpaid as everybody else, abused their positions'. It would serve no purpose to retrace the histories thereof herein. Suffice to say that colonialism and apartheid have been condemned in the world. Similarly, '[i]n Africa, liberation movements have a terrible record of governance' (Mashele and Qobo 2014: x) – the ANC has not broken that tradition. The ANC's 'shameful episodes in our short democratic history' (Feinstein 2007: xi) is in the public domain, electronic archives and print media, but more importantly, in the lived memories of 55 million South Africans.

However, 'historical advances have swept away some old myths and established some new truths' (Davidson 1991: 3). For instance, the rise and fall of the Zulu kingdom as a 'militarized state' that is associated with 'despotism' and 'using terror as a basis for absolute rule across a huge kingdom' (Thompson 2007: 82–83), the *Mfecane* and its aftermath as variants of an era of *intra*-colonization in South Africa, needs much more research to establish new truths about these. This would subject the view of e.g. Morris (1981: 60) that Shaka 'had little enough to do with the destruction of the interior'

to new interpretation of systematic colonization. The same holds true for *intra*-African colonization *before* the era of European colonization. In addition, this paper argues that the ANC has for more than two decades now, been practicing its own form of *neo*-colonialism in and of South Africa, long before the popular concept of 'state-capture' became the operative term for the state's corrupt and fraudulent policies and practices. In so-doing, the *ANC practised its own capitalism with a strong affinity for monopoly capital*. After all, Zuma once made it very clear that he did not join the struggle to remain poor (Van Onselen 2012). The rest of the ANC and government took their ques from Mbeki and Zuma and little from Mandela – thus placing the ANC on trial. The ANC is on trial because an ANC-problem has become a governance and national problem at the expense of the citizenry. ANC-capitalism has captured civic freedoms – something it claimed for over a century its wants to achieve – after all, it claimed to be a 'freedom' movement. The ANC is on trial for being sell-outs of such principles as a lack of ethical leadership by its own 'leaders' in government.

If then, WMC capital is such a bad thing, but at the same time the ANC has created and is looting its own ANC capitalist centres of accumulation, how is that accounted for? Or posed differently: against what theoretical framework does it need to be analysed? Part II will deals with *ANC-capitalism as an ecology in the life-world of South Africans.*

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